

Incident Handling, Forensics and Hacking Techniques

October 2011

Incident Handling & Forensics by SANS

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 - Community Instructor with SANS, Incident Handler, Penetration Tester, Standards Developer within ISO/ITU, IT Auditor, Security Consultant and Researcher, Risk Analyst
 - I love my work!
 - GCIH, GSEC, CISSP, CISA, ISO 2700I Lead Auditor
 - SEC 504 “Hacker Techniques, Exploits and Incident Handling”
 - SEC 464 “Hacker Detection for Systems Administrators”
 - Quarterly Continuing Education, Human Sensor Network
 - SEC 40I “Security Essentials”

Who do we have here today?

- What positions do we have represented in the room today?
 - Incident Handlers? Security Consultants?
 - Law Enforcement? CISO? Board of Directors?
 - Security Manager? Director of IT? IT Auditors?
- What are the biggest challenges in your day-to-day work?

Incident Response Process

Let's make sure we are all on the same page

Incident Response Strategy

- Most of the time we are called in after an incident/event has begun
- Our first steps must be to identify the existing Incident Response Plan and who is our Incident Coordinator
- No incident response plan? Our first lesson learned.

Core Concepts

- Don't Panic! Remain Calm.
- Take comprehensive notes
 - If you don't have enough time to take notes, you are moving too fast. Slow down. Take a deep breath.
- Get help, immediately. Work in 2x2 pairs.
- Enforce a need-to-know policy
- Use Out-of-Band Communication

Core Concepts (Cont.)

- Contain the incident and prevent more damage
- Make a bit-by-bit backup. Never operate on the original source.
- Eradicate the attacker and their hold
- Get back to business
- Learn from mistakes made

Preparation

- Getting ready to counter an attack
- Establishing Policies, Procedures and getting Management Buy-In
- Establishing network/traffic baselines
 - Gambling? Social Media? Movies? Doing harm?
- Notification guidelines for media
- Internal/external CIRTs / CERT and LEO contacts

Phases

- Preparation – Getting Ready to Respond
- Identification – What is worth investigating?
- Containment – Triage to Stop the Bleeding
- Eradication – Removing the Threat
- Recovery – Back to business as usual
- Lessons Learned – What went wrong?

Identification

- Determining if an event or incident has occurred
 - Event (no correlating logs, minimal impact)
 - Incident (corroborating evidence, potential for harm)
 - Verify system configuration, identify failures
- Declare an incident early so containment can begin
- Begin chain-of-custody - always work in 2x2 pairs
- Notify management and begin CIRT coordination

Containment

- Limit the scope of damage, stop the bleeding
- Back up the system (bit-by-bit copy) to **new** media
- Never operate from original data source
- Determine risk to continued operations
- Keep a low profile, but change passwords on compromised systems and dependent systems

Eradiation

- Isolate the attack, determine vectors and exploited vulnerabilities
- Implement protection measures to treat attack vectors; network/firewall filters, rename/re-IP, if system cannot be trusted rebuild on more hardened platform
- Identify additional vulnerabilities
- Locate a clean backup and prepare for recovery

Recovery

- Return system to operational state
- Restore, Validate, and Prevent future attacks
- After management has decided to bring the system back into production...
- Monitor for back doors and other attempted exploits

Lessons Learned

- How to prevent this from happening again?
- What is the root cause of the attack and what can be done to improve operations to limit risk
- Produce a detailed incident report and circulate to appropriate management
- Implement changes as approved by management

Enough with process...

Let's talk about practical application

Tools

- SANS Investigative Forensic Toolkit (SIFT) Workstation
 - <http://computer-forensics.sans.org/community/downloads>
- BackTrack
 - <http://www.backtrack-linux.org>
 - Focused on offense not analysis

The SIFT Workstation

- Developed by SANS
- A ton of tools ready to go
 - Supports images acquired with Expert Witness, RAW (dd) and Advanced Forensic Format (AFF)
 - The Sleuth Kit and GUI's for FS / disk analysis
 - log2timeline for timeline generation
 - Pasco for web history examination
 - the Volatility Framework for memory analysis
 - and many more...
- Covered in SEC 408 and SEC 508

Back|Track

- Back|Track by Offensive Computing
 - <http://www.backtrack-linux.org>
 - Focused on penetration, not analysis
 - Many of the same tools (under Forensics) but not as Incident Handler friendly
- Metasploit, Kismet, Ophcrack, Wireshark, BeEF (Browser Exploit Framework) and many more.
- Covered extensively in SEC 504

Computer Forensics Steps

- What are you investigating?
- Document the Scene
- Identify Data Sources and Locations
- Preserve the Evidence
- Analyze the collected data
- Present findings

Scenarios

- What are you investigating?
- Scenarios
 - Malware
 - Malicious Insider / Espionage
 - Phishing
 - Criminal Investigation

Document the Scene

- Documentation is key
- Before touching anything use your pen and notebook
- Photograph, sketch and label everything
- Take copious notes with date and time
 - These may end up in court

Identify Data Sources

- Forensics are both in-person and remote
- Data sources include servers, workstations, PDA's / smartphones, backups and network devices such as routers and switches...
 - ➔ and people!
- Logs are your friend, logs build a timeline and give insight
- Intrusion Detection Systems, Firewalls, Switch ports

Preserving Evidence

- Data Extraction
 - Before pulling the plug
 - After pulling the plug
 - Methods – in-line drive duplication, USB
 - Imaging – DD (unix)
 - EnCase by Guidance Software
 - FTK (Forensic Toolkit) by Access Data
- Backup Data, **NEVER** use original source
- Chain-of-Custody, Checksums, Photographs

Presenting Evidence

- Who is the audience?
- Local law enforcement, FBI, Secret Service
- Corporate “Legal”, HR, Audit, InfoSec
- Making your case, what is your conclusion?

Analyze Collected Data

- Some data will be in log format, timestamped, formatted and easily translated
- Most data will be “hidden” or abstracted
- Process, procedures and tools make this easier
- Understanding how technology works and is integrated into business is key

Hiding Data Intentionally

Not really steganography...


Hiding data intentionally

- Anyone watch CSI?
- You cannot “enhance the pixels”
- But you can store stuff in pictures!

```
mjh@kryptos:~/Pictures$ file rock-floating-demo.jpg
rock-floating-demo.jpg: JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01
mjh@kryptos:~/Pictures$ echo "Hello Class" >> hello.txt
mjh@kryptos:~/Pictures$ zip hello.zip hello.txt
  adding: hello.txt (stored 0%)
mjh@kryptos:~/Pictures$ cat hello.txt
Hello Class
mjh@kryptos:~/Pictures$ cat hello.zip >> rock-floating-demo.jpg
mjh@kryptos:~/Pictures$ rm hello.txt hello.zip
mjh@kryptos:~/Pictures$ file rock-floating-demo.jpg
rock-floating-demo.jpg: JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01
mjh@kryptos:~/Pictures$ unzip rock-floating-demo.jpg
Archive:  rock-floating-demo.jpg
warning [rock-floating-demo.jpg]:  172836 extra bytes at beginning or within zipfile
 (attempting to process anyway)
  extracting: hello.txt
mjh@kryptos:~/Pictures$ cat hello.txt
Hello Class
mjh@kryptos:~/Pictures$ █
```

Hiding Data in Images

- This image contains a ZIP file
- This is not steganography



File Formats & Data Structures

- A .zip file in an JPEG? How? Magic numbers.



- File formats are designated by magic numbers
- http://www.garykessler.net/library/file_sigs.html
- File extensions (.jpg, .zip) are for humans only

File Formats & Data Structures

- ZIP at the End

The screenshot shows a hex editor window titled "rock-floating-demo.jpg - GHex". The main window displays a grid of hexadecimal data. The address column on the left shows values from 0002A2D2 to 0002A39E. The data column contains various hex bytes. A red box highlights the bytes "50 4B 03 04" at address 0002A327. To the right of the hex editor, a text pane shows the corresponding ASCII characters, with "PK.." highlighted in red, indicating the start of a ZIP file signature. Above the hex editor, a status bar or tooltip displays the following information:

```
50 4B 03 04
PK..
ZIP PKZIP archive file (Ref. 1 | Ref. 2)
Trailer: filename 50 4B 17 characters 00 00 00
Trailer: (filename PK 17 characters ...)
```

Hiding Data Accidentally

The State of Solid State Drives

Solid State Drives

- SSD (Solid State Drives) bring new questions to forensic activities
- New models of SSD come with the TRIM function
- Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, Linux kernel 2.6.33 are TRIM compatible
- TRIM does “garbage collection” essentially defeating forensic activities by zeroing data and complicating drive wiping

SSD w/o TRIM

The screenshot shows the R-Studio File View interface. The main window displays a file tree on the left and a file list on the right. The file list shows a series of 'AC Promo' files and a few other files. The log window at the bottom shows the recovery process.

Sorted by: Real | Extensions | Creation Time | Modifications Time | Access Time

Log

Type	Date	Time	Text
System	3/1/2010	11:36:34 PM	Recover files started
Recover	3/1/2010	11:36:34 PM	Successfully restored: 1 files. Failed: 0 files.
System	3/1/2010	11:36:34 PM	Recover files completed
System	3/1/2010	11:37:32 PM	Recover files started
Recover	3/1/2010	11:37:32 PM	Successfully restored: 1 files. Failed: 0 files.
System	3/1/2010	11:37:32 PM	Recover files completed

Ready | Marked 43.55 KB in 1 files in 4 folders | Total 443.6B in 112.0 files in 31 folders

Techgaga.com

SSD with TRIM

Drives

Device/Disk	Label	FS	Sta
Local Computer			
INTEL SSDSA2MH080G1GC045C8820	CVEM8510005C...	#0 SAT...	
E:	NonTRIM	NTFS	1 MB
Recognized0		NTFS	0 Byte
Recognized1		FAT12	60.44 c
Extra Found Files			
INTEL SSDSA2M080G2GC2CV102HD	CVPO939200ZU08...	#1 SAT...	
F:	TRIM	NTFS	1 MB
ST3500320ASSD04	9QM080NQ	#2 SAT...	
Volume{8921eb5e-27d9-11df-b0d5-806e6f6e6969}	System Reserved	NTFS	1 MB
C:		NTFS	101 MB
TSSTcorpCDDVDW SH-S203BSB01			
D:			

Scan Information

E: - 74.53 GB (80024174592 Bytes, 156297216 Sectors) 195372 Sectors per block

Legend:

- Unused
- NTFS MFT File Entries 63
- NTFS Boot Sectors 1
- FAT Directories Entries 25
- Ext2/Ext3/Ext4 SuperBlock 0
- UFS/FFS CylinderGroup 0
- HFS/HFS+ BTree +Node 7
- Unrecognized
- NTFS Directories Entries 27
- FAT FAT Entries 1529
- FAT Boot Sectors 1
- UFS/FFS SuperBlock 0
- HFS/HFS+ VolumeHeader 0
- Specific File Documents 288407

Log

Type	Date	Time	Text
System	3/1/2010	11:03:12 PM	Scanning drive E: started
System	3/1/2010	11:18:00 PM	Scan has been completed for E: in 14m:48.379s
System	3/1/2010	11:18:00 PM	Scanning drive E: completed

Ready

Techgauge.com

Like what you've seen today?

- Sign up for **SEC 504**, Hacker Techniques, Exploits and Incident handling, taught locally starting January 18th, 2012 with Matthew J. Harmon over 10 weeks
 - <http://www.sans.org/mentor/details.php?nid=26769>
or <http://tinyurl.com/SEC504MplsJan2012>
- Sign up for **SEC 464**, Hacker Detection for Systems Administrators, taught at your convenience over 2 days
- or **SEC 401**, Security Essentials starting January 26th, 2012 with Eric Lucero over 10 weeks
 - <http://www.sans.org/mentor/details.php?nid=26649>

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